OCTOBER TERM, 2000
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit
No. 00-549. Argued April 18, 2001—Decided June 11, 2001
Petitioner, a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c). The District Court, citing Circuit precedent, dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Second Circuit expressed its view that § 1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. In this instance, the court noted, it was undisputed that King was an employee of his corporation and also acting within the scope of his authority. Under the court's analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs."
Held: In the circumstances of this case, § 1962(c) requires no more than the formal legal distinction between "person" and "enterprise" (namely, incorporation); hence, the provision applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner—whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority. This Court does not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a "person"; and (2) an "enterprise" that is not simply the same "person" referred to by a different name. Nonetheless, the Court disagrees with the appellate court's application of that "distinctness" principle to the present circumstances, in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, allegedly conducts the corporation's affairs in a RICO-forbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. The Court can find nothing in RICO that requires more "separateness" than that.Page: Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: October 4, 2007