Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 11 (2001)

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204

SAUCIER v. KATZ

Opinion of the Court

of the Court of Appeals' decision is that our decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), somehow changes matters. Graham, in respondent's view, sets forth an excessive force analysis indistinguishable from qualified immunity, rendering the separate immunity inquiry superfluous and inappropriate. Respondent asserts that, like the qualified immunity analysis applicable in other contexts, the excessive force test already affords officers latitude for mistaken beliefs as to the amount of force necessary, so that "Graham has addressed for the excessive force area most of the concerns expressed in Anderson." Brief for Respondents 7. Respondent points out that Graham did not address the interaction of excessive force claims and qualified immunity, since the issue was not raised, see 490 U. S., at 399, n. 12; and respondent seeks to distinguish Anderson on the theory that the issue of probable cause implicates evolving legal standards and resulting legal uncertainty, a subject raising recurrent questions of qualified immunity. By contrast, respondent says, excessive force is governed by the standard established in Graham, a standard providing ample guidance for particular situations. Finally, respondent adopts the suggestion made by one Court of Appeals that the relevant distinction is that probable cause is an ex post inquiry, whereas excessive force, like qualified immunity, should be evaluated from an ex ante perspective. See Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F. 2d 817, 824, n. 11 (CA2 1990).

These arguments or attempted distinctions cannot bear the weight respondent seeks to place upon them. Graham did not change the qualified immunity framework explained in Anderson. The inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force remain distinct, even after Graham.

In Graham, we held that claims of excessive force in the context of arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness standard," not under substantive due process principles.

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