INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 2 (2001)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

290

INS v. ST. CYR

Syllabus

second, if an otherwise acceptable construction would raise serious constitutional problems and an alternative interpretation is fairly possible, the statute must be construed to avoid such problems. Pp. 298-300.

(b) Construing the amendments at issue to preclude court review of a pure question of law would give rise to substantial constitutional questions. The Constitution's Suspension Clause, which protects the privilege of the habeas corpus writ, unquestionably requires some judicial intervention in deportation cases. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 235. Even assuming that the Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, substantial evidence supports St. Cyr's claim that pure questions of law could have been answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to issue the writ. Thus, a serious Suspension Clause issue would arise if the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute. The need to resolve such a serious and difficult constitutional question and the desirability of avoiding that necessity reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent. Pp. 300-305.

(c) To conclude that the writ is no longer available in this context would also represent a marked departure from historical immigration law practice. The writ has always been available to review the legality of Executive detention, see, e. g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 663, and, until the 1952 Act, a habeas action was the sole means of challenging a deportation order's legality, see, e. g., Heikkila, 345 U. S., at 235. Habeas courts have answered questions of law in alien suits challenging Executive interpretations of immigration law and questions of law that arose in the discretionary relief context. Pp. 305-308.

(d) Neither AEDPA 401(e) nor three IIRIRA provisions, 8 U. S. C. 1252(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), and (b)(9), express a clear and unambiguous statement of Congress' intent to bar 28 U. S. C. 2241 petitions. None of these sections even mentions 2241. Section 401(e)'s repeal of a subsection of the 1961 Act, which provided, inter alia, habeas relief for an alien in custody pursuant to a deportation order, is not sufficient to eliminate what the repealed section did not grant—namely, habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 2241. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 105- 106. The three IIRIRA provisions do not speak with sufficient clarity to bar habeas jurisdiction. They focus on "judicial review" or "juris-diction to review." In the immigration context, however, "judicial review" and "habeas corpus" have historically distinct meanings, with habeas courts playing a far narrower role. Pp. 308-314.

2. Section 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like St. Cyr, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. Pp. 314-326.

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007