376
Souter, J., concurring
dictional fact, but is relevant only insofar as it bears on the application of one of Montana's exceptions to a particular case. Insofar as I rest my conclusion on the general jurisdictional presumption, it follows for me that, although the holding in this case is "limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law," ante, at 358, n. 2, one rule independently supporting that holding (that as a general matter "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe," ante, at 359) is not so confined.
I
Petitioners are certainly correct that "[t]ribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers is . . . ill-defined," Reply Brief for Petitioners 16, since this Court's own pronouncements on the issue have pointed in seemingly opposite directions. Compare, e. g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 65 (1978) ("Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians"), and United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory"), with, e. g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 209 (1978) (" '[T]he limitation upon [tribes'] sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits except themselves' " (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 (1810))). Oliphant, however, clarified tribal courts' criminal jurisdiction (in holding that they had none as to non-Indians), and that decision is now seen as a significant step on the way to Montana, "the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers," Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 445 (1997). The path marked best is the rule
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