Cite as: 533 U. S. 353 (2001)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
officials facing civil liability, were entitled to have their immunity defenses adjudicated at the earliest stage possible to avoid needless litigation. It requires no "magic" to afford officials the same protection in tribal court that they would be afforded in state or federal court. Ante, at 373. I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in this case on the ground that it erred in failing to address the state officials' immunity defenses. It is possible that Hicks' lawsuits would have been easily disposed of on the basis of official and qualified immunity.
* * *
The Court issues a broad holding that significantly alters the principles that govern determinations of tribal adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction. While I agree that Montana guides our analysis, I do not believe that the Court has properly applied Montana. I would not adopt a per se rule of tribal jurisdiction that fails to consider adequately the Tribes' inherent sovereign interests in activities on their land, nor would I give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based solely on their status as state law enforcement officials. I would hold that Montana governs a tribe's civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, and that in order to protect government officials, immunity claims should be considered in reviewing tribal court jurisdiction. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring in the judgment.
While I join the Court's disposition of the case for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor, I do not agree with the Court's conclusion that tribal courts may not exercise their jurisdiction over claims seeking the relief authorized by 42
401
Page: Index Previous 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007