United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 15 (2001)

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Cite as: 533 U. S. 405 (2001)

Breyer, J., dissenting

ment issue just as much as restricting speech." Id., at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Any regulation that compels the funding of advertising must be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment scrutiny.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, and with whom Justice O'Connor joins as to Parts I and III, dissenting.

The Court, in my view, disregards controlling precedent, fails properly to analyze the strength of the relevant regulatory and commercial speech interests, and introduces into First Amendment law an unreasoned legal principle that may well pose an obstacle to the development of beneficial forms of economic regulation. I consequently dissent.

I

Only four years ago this Court considered a case very similar to this one, Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457 (1997). The issue there, like here, was whether the First Amendment prohibited the Government from collecting a fee for collective product advertising from an objecting grower of those products (nectarines, peaches, and plums). We held that the collection of the fee did not "rais[e] a First Amendment issue for us to resolve," but rather was "simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve." Id., at 468. We gave the following reasons in support of our conclusion:

"First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience. Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views." Id., at 469- 470.

419

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