Cite as: 533 U. S. 431 (2001)
Thomas, J., dissenting
646 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). If coordinated expenditures help achieve this aim, the achievement "does not . . . constitute 'a subversion of the political process.' " Ibid. (quoting Federal Election Comm'n, 470 U. S., at 497). It is simply the essence of our Nation's party system of government. One can speak of an individual citizen or a political action committee corrupting or coercing a candidate, but "[w]hat could it mean for a party to 'corrupt' its candidate or to exercise 'coercive' influence over him?" 518 U. S., at 646.
Apparently unable to provide an answer to this question, the Court relies upon an alternative theory of corruption. According to the Court, the Party Expenditure Provision helps combat circumvention of the limits on individual donors' contributions, which limits are necessary to reduce corruption by those donors.7 See ante, at 452-455. The primary problem with this contention, however, is that it too is plainly contradicted by the findings of the District Court, see 41 F. Supp. 2d, at 1211, and the overwhelming evidence in the record, see supra, at 475.8 And this contention is particularly surprising in light of Colorado I, in which we discussed the same opportunity for corruption through circumvention, and, far from finding it dispositive, concluded
7 The Court does not argue that the Party Expenditure Provision is necessary to reduce the perception of corruption. Nor could the record sustain such an argument. See 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 (Colo. 1999).
8 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 459, n. 21, the District Court did not simply conclude that "Colorado I had rejected the anti-circumvention rationale as a matter of law." Instead, the District Court first concluded there was no evidence of corruption, 41 F. Supp. 2d, at 1211. Only after the District Court made this factual finding did it, in a footnote, cite Colorado I to support the legal conclusion. See 41 F. Supp. 2d, at 1211, n. 9 ("Moreover, if the skirting of contribution limits is the issue with which the FEC is concerned . . . there are more tailored means of addressing such a concern than limiting the coordinated expenditure limits" (citing Colorado I)).
477
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