Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 62 (2001)

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586

LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. v. REILLY

Opinion of Thomas, J.

make individual cigar retailers more difficult to identify by making them change their names. Respondents assert no interest in cigar retailer anonymity, and it is difficult to conceive of any other interest to which this rule could be said to be narrowly tailored.

The regulations fail the narrow tailoring inquiry for another, more fundamental reason. In addition to examining a narrower advertising ban, the State should have examined ways of advancing its interest that do not require limiting speech at all. Here, respondents had several alternatives. Most obviously, they could have directly regulated the conduct with which they were concerned. See, e. g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476, 490-491 (1995) (invalidating ban on disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, in part because the Government could have pursued alternatives such as "directly limiting the alcohol content of beers"); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U. S., at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[I]t would seem that directly banning a product (or . . . otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always be at least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising"). Massachusetts already prohibits the sale of tobacco to minors, but it could take steps to enforce that prohibition more vigorously. It also could enact laws prohibiting the purchase, possession, or use of tobacco by minors. And, if its concern is that tobacco advertising communicates a message with which it disagrees, it could seek to counteract that message with "more speech, not enforced silence," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

III

Underlying many of the arguments of respondents and their amici is the idea that tobacco is in some sense sui gene-ris—that it is so special, so unlike any other object of regulation, that application of normal First Amendment principles should be suspended. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 50

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