598
Opinion of Stevens, J.
I, therefore, find the conclusion inescapable that the zoning regulation at issue in this suit is not a "requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to . . . advertising" within the meaning of the 1969 Act.7 Even if I were not so convinced, however, I would still dissent from the Court's conclusion with regard to pre-emption, because the provision is, at the very least, ambiguous. The historical record simply does not reflect that it was Congress' " 'clear and manifest purpose,' " id., at 516, to pre-empt attempts by States to utilize their traditional zoning authority to protect the health and welfare of minors. Absent such a manifest purpose, Massachusetts and its sister States retain their traditional police powers.8
containing approximately 14% of the State's population. See U. S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 28, 47, 49 (1999) (providing population figures for 1998). The area in which cigarette advertising is restricted is likely to be considerably less in less densely populated portions of the State. And even on the interpretation of this data most favorable to petitioners, the Massachusetts regulation still permits indoor and outdoor cigarette advertising in at least 10% of the geographical area of the State. In short, the regulation here is not the equivalent of a total ban on cigarette advertising.
7 Hence, while I agree in large part with the substance of the arguments proffered by the respondents and the United States on the pre-emption issue, I reject their conclusion that the content/location distinction finds expression in the limiting phrase "based on smoking and health." See Brief for Respondents 20; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5; accord, Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63 F. 3d 1318 (CA4 1995). Instead, I would follow the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits in concluding that a statute regulating the location of advertising is not a "requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to . . . advertising" within the meaning of the 1969 Act. See Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F. 3d 30, 39-41 (CA1 2000) (case below); Greater N. Y. Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F. 3d 100, 104-110 (CA2 1999); Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. Chicago, 189 F. 3d 633, 636-640 (CA7 1999).
8 The Court's holding that federal law precludes States and localities from protecting children from dangerous products within 1,000 feet of a school is particularly ironic given the Court's conclusion six years ago that
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