Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 15 (2001)

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670

TYLER v. CAIN

Breyer, J., dissenting

rules of criminal procedure," 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). A case announcing a new rule could conceivably hold that infringement of the rule "seriously diminish[es] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction," id., at 315, and that the rule " 'alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding,' " id., at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, supra, at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)); see also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990), without holding in so many words that the rule "applies retroactively" and without actually applying that rule retroactively to a case on collateral review. The "precise contours" of this Teague exception, of course, "may be difficult to discern," Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990), and the judgment involved in our "ma[king]" a new rule retroactive under this exception is likely to be more subjective and self-conscious than is the case with Teague's first exception. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the new rule comes within the Teague exception at all, but the more narrow and manageable inquiry of whether this Court's holdings, by strict logical necessity, "ma[k]e" the new rule retroactive within the meaning of § 2244(b)(2)(A). While such logical necessity does not obtain in this particular case, ante, at 665- 667, this Court could "ma[k]e" a new rule retroactive under Teague's second exception in this manner.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.

In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), this Court held that a certain jury instruction violated the Constitution because it inaccurately defined "reasonable doubt," thereby permitting a jury to convict "based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause." Id., at 41. Here we must decide whether this Court has "made" Cage "retroactive to cases on collateral

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