Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 27 (2001)

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Cite as: 533 U. S. 53 (2001)

O'Connor, J., dissenting

of the interests that it claims to be served by the provision. The majority also fails carefully to consider whether the sex-based classification is being used impermissibly "as a 'proxy for other, more germane bases of classification,' " Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 726 (quoting Craig, 429 U. S., at 198), and instead casually dismisses the relevance of available sex-neutral alternatives. And, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the fit between the means and ends of § 1409(a)(4) is far too attenuated for the provision to survive heightened scrutiny. In all, the majority opinion represents far less than the rigorous application of heightened scrutiny that our precedents require.

A

According to the Court, "[t]he first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists." Ante, at 62. The majority does not elaborate on the importance of this interest, which presumably lies in preventing fraudulent conveyances of citizenship. Nor does the majority demonstrate that this is one of the actual purposes of § 1409(a)(4). Assuming that Congress actually had this purpose in mind in enacting parts of § 1409(a)(4), cf. Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420, 435-436 (1998) (opinion of Stevens, J.), the INS does not appear to rely on this interest in its effort to sustain § 1409(a)(4)'s sex-based classification. Cf. Brief for Respondent 11 (claiming that § 1409 serves "at least two important interests: first, ensuring that children who are born abroad out of wedlock have, during their minority, attained a sufficiently recognized or formal relationship to their United States citizen parent—and thus to the United States—to justify the conferral of citizenship upon them; and second, preventing such children from being stateless"). In light of the reviewing court's duty to "determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive,' " Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533, this disparity between the majority's defense of the statute

79

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