Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
category separate from plants, but not separate from other living things.
Stare decisis, however, prevents us from any longer regarding as an open question—as ambiguous—whether "com-position of matter" includes living things. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 312-313 (1980), holds that it does. As the case comes before us, therefore, the language of the PPA—if it is to have any effect on the outcome—must do so by way of amending what we have held to be a statute that covers living things (and hence covers plants). At this point the canon against repeal by implication comes into play, and I agree with the Court that it determines the outcome. I therefore join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.
The question before us is whether the words "manufacture" or "composition of matter" contained in the utility patent statute, 35 U. S. C. § 101 (1994 ed.) (Utility Patent Statute), cover plants that also fall within the scope of two more specific statutes, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA), 35 U. S. C. § 161 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq. I believe that the words "manufacture" or "composition of matter" do not cover these plants. That is because Congress intended the two more specific statutes to exclude patent protection under the Utility Patent Statute for the plants to which the more specific Acts directly refer. And, as the Court implicitly recognizes, this Court neither considered nor decided this question in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303 (1980). Consequently, I dissent.
I
Respondent and the Government claim that Chakrabarty controls the outcome in this case. This is incorrect, for Chakrabarty said nothing about the specific issue before us.
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