Cite as: 534 U. S. 161 (2002)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
scribed in detail above was "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [petitioner] of the pendency of the action." Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. Due process requires no more.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
" 'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 [(1914)]. This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). Today's decision diminishes the safeguard of notice, affording an opportunity to be heard, before one is deprived of property. As adequate to notify prisoners that the Government seeks forfeiture of their property, the Court condones a procedure too lax to reliably ensure that a prisoner will receive a legal notice sent to him. The Court does so despite the Government's total control of a prison inmate's location, and the evident feasibility of tightening the notice procedure "as [would] one desirous of actually informing [the prisoner]." Id., at 315. Because the Court, without warrant in fact or law, approves a procedure "less likely to bring home notice" than a feasible alternative, ibid., I dissent.
I
The Court correctly identifies the foundational case on reasonable notice as a due process requirement, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., and the core instruction: "[D]eprivation of . . . property by adjudication [must] be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id., at 313. Further, the Court recognizes that petitioner Dusenbery's complaint does not
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