Cite as: 534 U. S. 19 (2001)
Syllabus
(c) At least equally telling, reading a general discovery rule into § 1681p would in practical effect render the express exception superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances. In the paradigmatic setting in which a plaintiff requests a credit report and the reporting agency responds by concealing its wrongdoing, the express exception would do no work other than that performed by a general discovery rule. The Court rejects Andrews' and the Government's attempt to give some independent scope to the exception by characterizing it as a codification of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The scenario constructed by Andrews and the Government to support this characterization is unlikely to occur in reality. In any event, Andrews and the Government concede that the independent function one could attribute to the express exception under their theory would arise only in rare and egregious cases. Adopting their position would therefore render the express exception insignificant, if not wholly superfluous, contrary to a cardinal principle of statutory construction. Pp. 29-31.
(d) Andrews' two additional arguments in defense of the decision below are unconvincing. First, her contention that a discovery rule is expressed in the words framing § 1681p's general rule—"date on which the liability arises"—is not compelled by the dictionary definition of "arise" and is unsupported by this Court's precedent. Second, Andrews' reliance on § 1681p's legislative history fails to convince the Court that Congress intended sub silentio to adopt a general discovery rule in addition to the limited one it expressly provided. Pp. 32-33.
2. Because the issue was not raised or briefed below, this Court does not reach Andrews' alternative argument that, even if § 1681p does not incorporate a general discovery rule, "liability" does not "arise" under the FCRA when a violation occurs, but only on a sometimes later date when "actual damages" materialize. The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has not adopted Andrews' argument and the Government does not join her in advancing it here. In any event, it is doubtful that the argument, even if valid, would aid Andrews in this case. Pp. 33-35.
225 F. 3d 1063, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 35.
Glen D. Nager argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Daniel H. Bromberg.
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