36
Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
presumption exists, a matter this case does not oblige us to decide . . ."). There is in my view little doubt that it is not, and our reluctance to say so today is inexplicable, given that we held, a mere four years ago, that a statute of limitations which says the period runs from "the date on which the cause of action arose," 29 U. S. C. § 1451(f)(1) (1994 ed.), "incorporates the standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action," Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).1
1 This analysis does not, as the Court asserts, ante, at 34, n. 6, "ri[p] Bay Area Laundry . . . from its berth." The question presented on which certiorari was granted in the case was not, as the Court now recharacterizes it, the generalized inquiry "whether a statute of limitations could commence to run on one day while the right to sue ripened on a later day," ibid., but rather (as set forth in somewhat abbreviated form in petitioner Bay Area Laundry's merits brief) the much more precise question, "When does the statute of limitations begin to run on an action under the Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq., to collect overdue employer withdrawal liability payments?" Brief for Petitioner, O. T. 1997, No. 96-370, p. i. (Framing of the question in respondent Ferbar Corporation's merits brief was virtually identical.) The Court's Bay Area Laundry opinion introduced its discussion of the merits as follows:
"[T]he Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit [which] held that the statute of limitations . . . runs from the date the employer misses a scheduled payment, not from the date of complete withdrawal. . . . The Third and Seventh Circuits have also held that the statute of limitations runs from the failure to make a payment . . . . We granted certiorari . . . to resolve these conflicts." 522 U. S., at 200.
The Court's assertion that we did not answer the question presented, and did not resolve the conflicts—held only that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to say that the limitations period commenced before there was a right of action, and not that the other Circuits were right to say that the period commenced upon the failure to make a payment—is as erroneous as it is implausible. Bay Area Laundry held that the cause of action arose when "the employer violated an obligation owed the plan," id., at
Page: Index Previous 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007