450
Opinion of the Court
to reject the assertion that the Coal Act's definition of 'related person' is, on its face, absurd." Id., at 308. Alternatively, the court reasoned, even if the literal text of the statute produced an arguably anomalous result, "we are not simply free to ignore unambiguous language because we can imagine a preferable version." Ibid. This was not one of those rare cases, the court concluded, where Congress had drafted a statute that "produced an absurdity 'so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.' " Ibid. (quoting Maryland Dept. of Ed. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 F. 3d 165, 169 (CA4 1996)).
We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 993 (2001), and now affirm.
III
As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute. The first step "is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 340 (1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 240 (1989)). The inquiry ceases "if the statutory language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.' " 519 U. S., at 340.
With respect to the question presented in this case, this statute is unambiguous. The statutory text instructs that the Coal Act does not permit the Commissioner to assign beneficiaries to the successor in interest of a signatory operator. The statute provides:
"For purposes of this chapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall, before October 1, 1993, assign each coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which (or any related person with respect to which) remains in business in the following order:
"(1) First, to the signatory operator which—
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