554
Stevens, J., dissenting
seems to me quite clear that the application of the tolling rule does not raise a serious constitutional issue.13
It is true, of course, that the federal tolling provision, like any other federal statute that pre-empts state law, "affects the federal balance" even though it does not "constitut[e] an abrogation of state sovereign immunity." Ante, at 544. But that consequence is surely not sufficient to exclude state parties from the coverage of statutes of general applicability like the Bankruptcy Code, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, or any other federal statute whose general language creates a conflict with a pre-existing rule of state law.14 In my judgment, the specific holding in Alden v. Maine represented a serious distortion of the federal balance intended by the Framers of our Constitution. If that case is now to provide the basis for a rule of construction that will exempt state parties from the coverage of federal statutes of general applicability, whether or not abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is at stake, it will foster unintended and unjust consequences and impose serious burdens on an already-overworked Congress.15 Indeed, that risk provides
13 Indeed, as an alternative basis for its decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that equitable tolling was appropriate. See 604 N. W. 2d, at 133-134. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion that equitable tolling was permissible, but rather found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal of such tolling. See 620 N. W. 2d, at 687.
14 See, e. g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000) (finding pre-emption of common-law tort action by National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S. 833 (1997) (finding pre-emption of state community property laws by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
15 It may also impose serious burdens on already-overworked state courts. Claims brought under state antidiscrimination statutes such as the MHRA, for example, will often be bound up with claims under similar federal statutes, such as 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The state courts have concurrent
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