ing and determination of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court." 271 F. 3d, at 541.
Although the Court of Appeals may have simply overlooked Caspari, its opinion can also be read to imply that AEDPA has changed the relevant legal principles articulated in Caspari, see 271 F. 3d, at 541, n. 13 ("We note, however, that recent decisions have called into question to what extent Teague has continued force independent of AEDPA"). While it is of course a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA standard of review set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) ("[a]n application . . . shall not be granted . . . unless" the AEDPA standard of review is satisfied (emphasis added)), none of our post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard, or that AEDPA relieves courts from the responsibility of addressing properly raised Teague arguments. To the contrary, if our post-AEDPA cases suggest anything about AEDPA's relationship to Teague, it is that the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct. See, e. g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 669-670 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (construing successive application provisions of AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (construing § 2254(d)). Thus, in addition to performing any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state.
We reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that "Teague is not implicated" by this case, 271 F. 3d, at 543, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Last modified: October 4, 2007