Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 11 (2002)

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Opinion of the Court

but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Id., at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (cited in Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at 561; Stucky, 260 F. 3d, at 441; and Tocher, 219 F. 3d, at 1051). The dissent asserts the same argument vigorously. In its words: "The only conceivable reason" for the separate enumeration of States and their political subdivisions in 14501(c)(1) is to "establish . . . two separate categories of state power—state power exercised through political subdivisions and state power exercised by the State directly— that are later treated differently in the exceptions to the rule." Post, at 445.

We acknowledge that 14501(c)'s "disparate inclusion [and] exclusion" of the words "political subdivisions" support an argument of some force, one that could not have been made in Mortier. Nevertheless, reading 14501(c)'s set of exceptions in combination, and with a view to the basic tenets of our federal system pivotal in Mortier, we conclude that the statute does not provide the requisite "clear and manifest indication that Congress sought to supplant local authority." 501 U. S., at 611.

Respondents Ours Garage and TRAO, as just noted, contrast the first statutory exception to 14501(c)'s preemption rule, i. e., the exception preserving "the safety regulatory authority of a State," 14501(c)(2)(A), with the third exception, preserving the "authority of a State or a political subdivision to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision relating to the price" charged for nonconsensual towing, 14501(c)(2)(C). See Brief for Respondents 15-16. The nonconsensual towing exception tracks the language and structure of the general preemption rule, omitting only the reference to a "political authority of 2 or more States." Similarly styled, the fourth exception, for carrier-requested regulations in areas such as "uniform cargo liability" and antitrust immunity, 14501(c)(3), completely parallels the word-

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