Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
meant to include only that power or authority exercised at the state level (as, for example, in the phrase "State and local governmental authority"). The issue is whether, when 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V) excepts from the preclusionary command of § 14501(c)(1) "the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles," it means to except the safety regulatory authority of cities and counties as well. In my view it plainly does not.
There are four exceptions to the preclusionary rule of § 14501(c)(1), which read as follows:
"(2) Matters not covered.—[The preemption rule]—
"(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization;
"(B) does not apply to the transportation of household goods; and
"(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision relating to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.
"(3) State standard transportation practices.—
"(A) Continuation.—[The preemption rule] shall not affect any authority of a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States to
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