464
Opinion of the Court
as in Franklin, "substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision . . . ." 505 U. S., at 803 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
Moreover, in terms of our "standing" precedent, the courts would have ordered a change in a legal status (that of the "report"), and the practical consequence of that change would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered. We have found standing in similar circumstances. See, e. g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 25 (1998) (standing to obtain court determination that the organization was a "political committee" where that determination would make agency more likely to require reporting, despite agency's power not to order reporting regardless); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 169-171 (1997) (similar in respect to determination of the lawfulness of an agency's biological report); Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1991) (similar in respect to determination that transfer of airport control to local agency is unlawful). And related cases in which we have denied standing involved a significantly more speculative likelihood of obtaining ultimate relief. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 564- 565, n. 2 (obtaining ultimate relief "speculative"); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 42 (1976) (same). We consequently conclude that Utah has standing here, and we have jurisdiction.
III
Utah rests its statutory claim on a federal sampling statute which reads as follows:
"Except for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he con-
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