10
Per Curiam
to reaching an agreement as long as the language used does not coerce a particular type of verdict.' " 291 F. 3d, at 579. The Ninth Circuit found this statement to be "contrary to" both Jenkins v. United States, 380 U. S. 445 (1965) (per curiam), and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (1978), which it construed to prohibit pressing the jurors to arrive at some verdict, not just " 'a particular type of verdict.' " 291 F. 3d, at 579. Neither Jenkins nor Gypsum Co. is relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) determination, since neither case sets forth a rule applicable to state-court proceedings. Jenkins and Gypsum Co. reversed convictions based on jury instructions given in federal prosecutions, and neither opinion purported to interpret any provision of the Constitution. That alone would be enough to defeat a claim that their application to state-court proceedings is "clearly established." Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra, at 239, n. 2 (citation omitted), however, removed any lingering doubt regarding these cases' application to state convictions when it stated: "[O]ur ruling in Jenkins v. United States was based on our supervisory power over the federal courts, and not on constitutional grounds. The Jenkins Court cited no provision of the Constitution, but rather relied upon other cases involving the exercise of supervisory powers." (The same was true of Gypsum Co.) Jenkins and Gypsum Co. are off the table as far as § 2254(d) is concerned, and the Ninth Circuit erred by relying on those nonconstitutional decisions.
Having determined that the Court of Appeal "failed to apply" clearly established Supreme Court law, 291 F. 3d, at 579 (a phrase which the opinion repeatedly and erroneously substitutes for the more demanding requirement of § 2254(d)(1): that the decision be "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law), the Ninth Circuit then proceeded to address the question "whether [the Court of Appeal's] decision constituted error and if so whether the error had a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict." Ibid. But that inquiry would have been proper only if the Ninth Circuit
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