Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 10 (2003)

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158

BARNHART v. PEABODY COAL CO.

Opinion of the Court

wards of the UMWA Pension Plan, the AML Fund, and, potentially, of coal operators without prior relationship to these beneficiaries. The companies, in other words, say that as to tardily assigned beneficiaries who were, perhaps, formerly their own employees, they go scot free. We think the claim is as unsupportable as it is counterintuitive.

A

First there is the companies' position that couching the duty in terms of the mandatory "shall" together with a specific deadline leaves the Commissioner with no authority to make an initial assignment on or after October 1, 1993. We rejected a comparable argument in Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253 (1986), dealing with the power of the Secretary of Labor to audit a grant recipient under a provision that he " 'shall' issue a final determination . . . within 120 days" of receiving a complaint alleging misuse of federal grant funds. Id., at 255. Like the Court of Appeals here, the Ninth Circuit in Brock thought the mandate and deadline together implied that Congress "had intended to prevent the Secretary from acting" after the statutory period, id., at 257. We, on the contrary, expressed reluctance "to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake," id., at 260, and reversed. As in this litigation, the Secretary's responsibility in Brock was "substantial," the "ability to complete it within 120 days [was] subject to factors beyond [the Secretary's] control," and "the Secretary's delay, under respondent's theory, would prejudice the rights of the taxpaying public." Id., at 261. We accordingly read the 120-day provision as meant "to spur the Secretary to action, not to limit the scope of his authority," so that untimely action was still valid. Id., at 265.

Nor, since Brock, have we ever construed a provision that the Government "shall" act within a specified time, without more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding action later. Thus,

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