22
Per Curiam
"unreasonable application" conditions of § 2254(d)(1), and affirmed the District Court's grant of relief. See 288 F. 3d, at 1118-1119. The State of California petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we now grant along with respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
II
A
We consider first the Ninth Circuit's holding that the California Supreme Court's decision was "contrary to" our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Strickland held that to prove prejudice the defendant must establish a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's un-professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id., at 694 (emphasis added); it specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered, id., at 693. The Court of Appeals read the State Supreme Court opinion in this case as applying the latter test— as requiring respondent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the result of the sentencing proceedings would have been different. See 288 F. 3d, at 1108-1109. That is, in our view, a mischaracterization of the state-court opinion, which expressed and applied the proper standard for evaluating prejudice.
The California Supreme Court began its analysis of the prejudice inquiry by setting forth the "reasonable probability" criterion, with a citation of the relevant passage in Strickland; and it proceeded to state that "[t]he question we must answer is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors and omissions, the sentencing authority would have found that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant imposition of the death penalty," again with a citation of Strickland. In re Visciotti, 14 Cal. 4th, at 352, 926 P. 2d, at 1003 (citing Strickland, supra, at 696). Twice, the court framed its inquiry as
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