Cite as: 537 U. S. 186 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
only, and where line-drawing among constitutional interests is at issue, I would look harder than does the majority at the statute's rationality—though less hard than precedent might justify, see, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 446-450 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 223-224 (1982); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534-538 (1973).
Thus, I would find that the statute lacks the constitutionally necessary rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any significant Clause-related objective. Where, after examination of the statute, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, even to dispute these characterizations, Congress' "choice is clearly wrong." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937).
II
A
Because we must examine the relevant statutory effects in light of the Copyright Clause's own purposes, we should begin by reviewing the basic objectives of that Clause. The Clause authorizes a "tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers." 56 Parl. Deb. (3d Ser.) (1841) 341, 350 (Lord Macaulay). Why? What constitutional purposes does the "bounty" serve?
The Constitution itself describes the basic Clause objective as one of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science," i. e., knowledge and learning. The Clause exists not to "provide a special private benefit," Sony, supra, at 429, but "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good," Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975). It does so by "motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors" through "the provision of a special reward." Sony, supra, at 429. The "reward" is a means, not an end. And that is
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