Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 11 (2003)

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532

CLAY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

does not justify the conclusion that 2255, ¶ 6(1)'s limitation period begins to run at one of those times rather than the other. Cf. supra, at 529-531. Second, 2263(a) ties the applicable limitation period to "affirmance of the conviction and sentence," while 2255, ¶ 6(1), ties the limitation period to the date when "the judgment of conviction becomes final." See Torres, 211 F. 3d, at 845 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). "The Russello presumption—that the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals Congress' design—grows weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection." Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 435-436 (2002).

* * *

We hold that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari with this Court on direct review, 2255's one-year limitation period starts to run when the time for seeking such review expires. Under this rule, Clay's 2255 petition was timely filed. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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