96
Stevens, J., dissenting
signed to cure procedural violations in an earlier proceeding—here, a habeas corpus proceeding—that raise questions about that proceeding's integrity.
. . . . .
"As a final note, I would add that this rule is not just consistent with case law, but it also comports with the fair and equitable administration of justice. If, for example, a death row inmate could show that the State indeed committed fraud upon the district court during his habeas corpus proceeding, it would be a miscarriage of justice if we turned a blind eye to such abuse of the judicial process. Nevertheless, this is the result that would occur if habeas corpus petitioners' Rule 60(b) motions were always considered 'second or successive' habeas corpus petitions. After all, a claim of prosecutorial fraud does not rely on 'a new rule of constitutional law' and may not 'establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.' 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2). It is a claim that nonetheless must be recognized." Mobley v. Head, 306 F. 3d 1096, 1100- 1105 (CA11 2002) (dissenting opinion).
Judge Tjoflat's reasoning is fully consistent with this Court's decisions in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998), and Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473 (2000). Applying that reasoning to the present case, it is perfectly clear that the petitioner filed a proper Rule 60(b) motion. (Whether it should have been granted is a different question.) The motion did not purport to set forth the basis for a second or successive challenge to the state-court judgment of conviction. It did, however, seek relief from the final order entered by the federal court in the habeas proceeding, and it relied on grounds that are either directly or indirectly identified in Rule 60(b) as possible bases for such relief. Essentially it submitted that the "changes in the . . . legal land-
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