Cite as: 538 U. S. 188 (2003)
Scalia, J., concurring
ess' " analysis when a more specific constitutional provision governs.
As for respondents' assertion that referendums may not be used to decide whether low-income housing may be built on their land: that is not a substantive-due-process claim, but rather a challenge to the procedures by which respondents were deprived of their alleged liberty interest in building on their land. There is nothing procedurally defective about conditioning the right to build low-income housing on the outcome of a popular referendum, cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), and the delay in issuing the permit was prescribed by a duly enacted provision of the Cuyahoga Falls City Charter (Art. 9, § 2), which surely constitutes "due process of law," see Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, ante, p. 8 (Scalia, J., concurring).
With these observations, I join the Court's opinion.
201
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14Last modified: October 4, 2007