282
Kennedy, J., concurring
Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c). See post, at 310-312. That is to say, in the dissent's view a redistricted State is not "redistricted" within the meaning of § 2a(c) if the districts have not been precleared, but it is "redistricted" even if the districts are patently unconstitutional (so long as they have been precleared, or the State is not subject to the pre-clearance requirement). Section 2a(c), of course, has no "preclearance exception." If redistricting "in the manner provided by [state] law" is ineffective when a federal statute (§ 5 preclearance) has been disregarded, surely it is also ineffective when the Federal Constitution has been disregarded. It is not we but the dissent that reads into the text of § 2a(c) ("redistricted in the manner provided by [state] law") distinctions that have no basis in reality.
* * *
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join as to Part II, concurring.
I
I join the Court's opinion and the plurality opinion in Parts III-B and IV. The Court's opinion makes clear why the District Court was correct to enjoin the redistricting plan developed by the Mississippi State Chancery Court as not pre-cleared under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Ante, at 261-265. The Court then vacates the District Court's alternative holding that the state-court plan violated Article I, § 4, of the United States Constitution. Ante, at 265-266.
II
It seems appropriate to explain why, in my view, our ruling vacating the judgment is mandated by our earlier cases. There is precedent for our ruling. See Connor v. Waller,
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