Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 7 (2003)

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320

ARCHER v. WARNER

Opinion of the Court

recovery" previously available to Brown, whether or not Brown had previously "asserted" those grounds in the prior state-court "proceeding." 442 U. S., at 131. But all this, the Court held, was beside the point. Claim preclusion did not prevent the Bankruptcy Court from looking beyond the record of the state-court proceeding and the documents that terminated that proceeding (the stipulation and consent judgment) in order to decide whether the debt at issue (namely, the debt embodied in the consent decree and stipulation) was a debt for money obtained by fraud. Id., at 138-139.

As a matter of logic, Brown's holding means that the Fourth Circuit's novation theory cannot be right. The reduction of Brown's state-court fraud claim to a stipulation (embodied in a consent decree) worked the same kind of novation as the "novation" at issue here. (Despite the dissent's suggestions to the contrary, post, at 327, it did so by an agreement of the parties that would seem to have "sever[ed] the causal relationship," ibid., between liquidated debt and underlying fraud no more and no less than did the settlement and releases at issue here.) Yet, in Brown, this Court held that the Bankruptcy Court should look behind that stipulation to determine whether it reflected settlement of a valid claim for fraud. If the Fourth Circuit's view were correct—if reducing a fraud claim to settlement definitively changed the nature of the debt for dischargeability purposes—the nature of the debt in Brown would have changed similarly, thereby rendering the debt dischargeable. This Court's instruction that the Bankruptcy Court could "weigh all the evidence," 442 U. S., at 138, would have been pointless. There would have been nothing for the Bankruptcy Court to examine.

Moreover, the Court's language in Brown strongly favors the Archers' position here. The Court said that "the mere fact that a conscientious creditor has previously reduced his claim to judgment should not bar further inquiry into the

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