Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 68 (2003)

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Cite as: 538 U. S. 510 (2003)

Opinion of Breyer, J.

seems to me the rough equivalent of the entry of an order of removal. See id., at 699-701 (reading the statute, under constitutional compulsion, as commonly imposing a presumption of a 6-month "reasonable" time limit for post-removal-order detention).

This case, however, is not one in which an alien concedes deportability. As Justice Souter points out, Kim argues to the contrary. See ante, at 541-542 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Kim claims that his earlier convictions were neither for an " 'aggravated felony' " nor for two crimes of " 'moral turpitude.' " Brief for Respondent 3, 11-12, 31-32, and n. 29. And given shifting lower court views on such matters, I cannot say that his arguments are insubstantial or interposed solely for purposes of delay. See, e. g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F. 3d 1201, 1213 (CA9 2002) (petty theft with a prior not an "aggravated felony"). Compare Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F. 3d 254, 259 (CA5 2002) (" 'Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved' "), with Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F. 2d 580, 580-581 (CA5 1938) ("Moral turpitude" involves " '[a]nything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals' "), and Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F. 2d 183, 184 (CA3 1956) ("The borderline of 'moral turpitude' is not an easy one to locate").

That being so—as long as Kim's legal arguments are neither insubstantial nor interposed solely for purposes of delay—then the immigration statutes, interpreted in light of the Constitution, permit Kim (if neither dangerous nor a flight risk) to obtain bail. For one thing, Kim's constitutional claims to bail in these circumstances are strong. See ante, at 548-552, 557-558 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, they are strong enough to require us to "ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may

577

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