Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 26 (2003)

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Cite as: 538 U. S. 600 (2003)

Scalia, J., concurring

vast majority (in this case 85 percent) of all funds donated"), the answer to the question would be yes.

It is the teaching of Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 793 (1988), and Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 966 (1984), that since there is such wide disparity in the legitimate expenses borne by charities, it is not possible to establish a maximum percentage that is reasonable. It also follows from that premise that there can in general be no reasonable expectation on the part of donors as to what fraction of the gross proceeds goes to expenses. When that proposition is combined with the unquestionable fact that one who is promised, without further specification, that his charitable contribution will go to a particular cause must reasonably understand that it will go there after the deduction of legitimate expenses, the conclusion must be that the promise is not broken (and hence fraud is not committed) by the mere fact that expenses are very high. Today's judgment, however, rests upon a "solid core" of misrepresentations, ante, at 620, that go well beyond mere commitment of the collected funds to the charitable purpose.

625

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