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Opinion of the Court
tion." 270 F. 3d, at 766. It then noted that the California Court of Appeal compared the facts of Andrade's case to the facts of Rummel, but not Solem. 270 F. 3d, at 766. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it should grant the writ of habeas corpus because the state court's "disregard for Solem results in an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law," and "is irreconcilable with . . . Solem," thus constituting "clear error." Id., at 766-767.
Judge Sneed dissented in relevant part. He wrote that "[t]he sentence imposed in this case is not one of the 'exceedingly rare' terms of imprisonment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment." Id., at 767 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Under his view, the state court decision upholding Andrade's sentence was thus "not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." 270 F. 3d, at 772. We granted certiorari, 535 U. S. 969 (2002), and now reverse.
II
Andrade's argument in this Court is that two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for stealing approximately $150 in videotapes is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Andrade similarly maintains that the state court decision affirming his sentence is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
AEDPA circumscribes a federal habeas court's review of a state court decision. Section 2254 provides:
"(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
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