Cite as: 538 U. S. 715 (2003)
Per Curiam
stantial than the governmental interest in the 30-day hearing delay in Mallen, namely, the need to protect the integrity of the banking system and to prepare thoroughly for the hearing. Mallen, supra, at 244. We also add that the reason for denying a predeprivation hearing here—such a hearing is impossible if the city is to be able to enforce the parking rules—is not any less important than in Mallen.
We conclude that the 27-day delay in holding a hearing here reflects no more than a routine delay substantially required by administrative needs. Our cases make clear that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit an agency from imposing this kind of procedural delay when holding hearings to consider claims of the kind here at issue. The Ninth Circuit's judgment to the contrary is reversed.
It is so ordered.
719
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5Last modified: October 4, 2007