Cite as: 538 U. S. 760 (2003)
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
the officer acted with the intent of exploiting Martinez's condition for purposes of extracting a statement.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that a cause of action under § 1983 has been stated. The other opinions filed today, however, reach different conclusions as to the correct disposition of the case. Were Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and I to adhere to our position, there would be no controlling judgment of the Court. In these circumstances, and because a ruling on substantive due process in this case could provide much of the essential protection the Self-Incrimination Clause secures, I join Part II of Justice Souter's opinion and would remand the case for further consideration.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts II and III of Justice Kennedy's opinion. For reasons well stated therein, I would hold that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at the time and place police use severe compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect. See ante, at 790-798 and this page (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The evidence in this case, as Justice Kennedy explains, supports the conclusion "that the suspect thought his treatment would be delayed, and thus his pain and condition worsened, by refusal to answer questions." Ante, at 797. I write separately to state my view that, even if no finding were made concerning Martinez's belief that refusal to answer would delay his treatment, or Chavez's intent to create such an impression, the interrogation in this case would remain a clear instance of the kind of compulsion no reasonable officer would have thought constitutionally permissible.
In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), appropriately referenced by Justice Kennedy, see ante, at 798, this Court held involuntary certain statements made during an in-
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