Cite as: 539 U. S. 194 (2003)
Souter, J., dissenting
cially in branch libraries, which are often less well staffed than main libraries." 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411 (ED Pa. 2002); see id., at 487-488 (same).
In any event, we are here to review a statute, and the unblocking provisions simply cannot be construed, even for constitutional avoidance purposes, to say that a library must unblock upon adult request, no conditions imposed and no questions asked. First, the statute says only that a library "may" unblock, not that it must. 20 U. S. C. § 9134(f)(3); see 47 U. S. C. § 254(h)(6)(D). In addition, it allows unblocking only for "bona fide research or other lawful purposes," 20 U. S. C. § 9134(f)(3); see 47 U. S. C. § 254(h)(6)(D), and if the "lawful purposes" criterion means anything that would not subsume and render the "bona fide research" criterion superfluous, it must impose some limit on eligibility for unblocking, see, e. g., Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) ("[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous"). There is therefore necessarily some restriction, which is surely made more onerous by the uncertainty of its terms and the generosity of its discretion to library staffs in deciding who gets complete Internet access and who does not. Cf. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 130 (1992) (noting that the First Amendment bars licensing schemes that grant unduly broad discretion to licensing officials, given the potential for such discretion to "becom[e] a means of suppressing a particular point of view" (internal quotation marks omitted)).1
We therefore have to take the statute on the understanding that adults will be denied access to a substantial amount of nonobscene material harmful to children but lawful for
1 If the Solicitor General's representation turns out to be honored in the breach by local libraries, it goes without saying that our decision today would not foreclose an as-applied challenge. See also ante, at 219-220 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); ante, at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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