440
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Counsel 49, 50 (1986) ("[W]e believe that [Zschernig] represents the Court's reaction to a particular regulatory statute, the operation of which intruded extraordinarily deeply into foreign affairs."). The HVIRA entails no such state action or policy. It takes no position on any contemporary foreign government and requires no assessment of any existing foreign regime. It is directed solely at private insurers doing business in California, and it requires them solely to disclose information in their or their affiliates' possession or control. I would not extend Zschernig into this dissimilar domain.4
Neither would I stretch Belmont, Pink, or Dames & Moore to support implied preemption by executive agreement. In each of those cases, the Court gave effect to the express terms of an executive agreement. In Dames & Moore, for example, the Court addressed an agreement explicitly extinguishing certain suits in domestic courts. 453 U. S., at 665; see supra, at 437-438. Here, however, none of the executive agreements extinguish any underlying claim for relief. See Neuborne, 80 Wash. U. L. Q., at 824, n. 101. The United States has agreed to file precatory statements advising courts that dismissing Holocaust-era claims accords with American foreign policy, but the German Foundation Agreement confirms that such statements have no legally binding effect. See 39 Int'l Legal Materials, at 1304; supra, at 436. It remains uncertain, therefore, whether even litigation on Holocaust-era insurance claims must be abated in deference to the German Foundation Agreement or the parallel agreements with Austria and France. Indeed, ambigu-4 The Court also places considerable weight on Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363 (2000). As the Court acknowledges, however, ante, at 423, Crosby was a statutory preemption case. The state law there at issue posed "an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full objectives under the [relevant] federal Act." 530 U. S., at 373. That statutory decision provides little support for preempting a state law by inferring preclusive foreign policy objectives from precatory language in executive agreements.
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