Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 39 (2003)

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Cite as: 539 U. S. 607 (2003)

Kennedy, J., dissenting

ting banishment of dangerous rogues); the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 28 (1829) (providing for the banishment of Jesuits). By law, then, a charge of high treason would have made Clarendon liable to banishment, which is inconsistent with Justice Chase's formulation.

To explain away the inconsistency, the Court redefines the words "by law" to refer only to punishments "not otherwise available 'in the ordinary course of law.' " Ante, at 614 (quoting 2 Wooddeson 638). As already explained, it was an accepted procedure in 17th-century England for Parliament to pass laws imposing banishment.

The majority must mean, then, that banishment was not available through the courts. At the time of Clarendon's trial, however, British courts were empowered to adjudicate treason and to punish it with death. 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *348-*351; see also 2 Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law 1799-1800 (2d ed. 1977). If the charges against Clarendon accurately alleged treason, he was eligible, through ordinary judicial proceedings, to receive capital punishment, which was obviously a sanction more severe than banishment. For the majority's historical explanation to work, Justice Chase's alternative description of the second category would have to prohibit laws which inflicted a punishment where the party was not, through normal judicial proceedings, liable to that precise punishment but was liable to a greater one. This formulation can hardly be reconciled with the words Justice Chase used, much less with his principal formulation of the second category. A legislature does not make an individual's crime "greater than it was, when committed," Calder, supra, at 390, by assigning a punishment less severe than the one available through the courts.

If Justice Chase's reference to Clarendon's trial is to have explanatory power, one must look for an alternative interpretation. What was repulsive to Chase and Wooddeson in Clarendon's trial was not the imposition of banishment as such, but that the sanction was outside the limits of what

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