McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 87 (2003)

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186

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

B

Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 4, and, by impairing the authority of the States to regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of federalism. In examining congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on laws that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regulates the conduct of private parties. It imposes no requirements whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own restrictions on the financing of state electoral campaigns. It is true that Title I, as amended, prohibits some fundraising tactics that would otherwise be permitted under the laws of various States, and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing of state electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do not render BCRA unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, e. g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buy-pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption. It has done so here. At bottom, Justice Kennedy has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous scrutiny—which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys particular expertise—applies to assess limits on campaign contributions. Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 465 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Thomas for the proposition that "Buckley should be overruled" (citation omitted)); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 405-410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

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