McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 99 (2003)

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198

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

that compelled disclosures may impose an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause. Nevertheless, Buckley rejected the contention that FECA's disclosure requirements could not constitutionally be applied to minor parties and independent candidates because the Government's interest in obtaining information from such parties was minimal and the danger of infringing their rights substantial. In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we found no evidence that any party had been exposed to economic reprisals or physical threats as a result of the compelled disclosures. 424 U. S., at 69-70. We acknowledged that such a case might arise in the future, however, and addressed the standard of proof that would then apply:

"We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Id., at 74.

A few years later we used that standard to resolve a minor party's challenge to the constitutionality of the State of Ohio's disclosure requirements. We held that the First Amendment prohibits States from compelling disclosures that would subject identified persons to "threats, harassment, and reprisals," and that the District Court's findings

ity." 357 U. S., at 462. We thought it apparent that the compelled disclosure would "affect adversely" the NAACP and its members' ability "to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate." Id., at 462-463. Under these circumstances, we concluded that Alabama's interest in determining whether the NAACP was doing business in the State was plainly insufficient to justify its production order. Id., at 464-466.

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