McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 191 (2003)

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290

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

By express terms, Title I imposes multiple different forms of spending caps on parties, candidates, and their agents. See new FECA §§ 323(a), (e), and (f).

Title I allows state parties to raise quasi-soft-money Levin funds for use in activities that might affect a federal election; but the Act prohibits national parties from assisting state parties in developing and executing these fundraising plans, even when the parties seek only to advance state election interests. See new FECA § 323(b).

Until today's consolidated cases, the Court has accepted but two principles to use in determining the validity of campaign finance restrictions. First is the anticorruption rationale. The principal concern, of course, is the agreement for a quid pro quo between officeholders (or candidates) and those who would seek to influence them. The Court has said the interest in preventing corruption allows limitations on receipt of the quid by a candidate or officeholder, regardless of who gives it or of the intent of the donor or officeholder. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 26-27, 45-48; infra, at 291-294. Second, the Court has analyzed laws that classify on the basis of the speaker's corporate or union identity under the corporate speech rationale. The Court has said that the willing adoption of the entity form by corporations and unions justifies regulating them differently: Their ability to give candidates quids may be subject not only to limits but also to outright bans; their electoral speech may likewise be curtailed. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 659-660; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 201-211 (1982).

The majority today opens with rhetoric that suggests a conflation of the anticorruption rationale with the corporate speech rationale. See ante, at 115-118 (hearkening back to, among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy against the use of corporate funds in political campaigning). The conflation appears designed to cast the speech regulated here as un-

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