Cite as: 540 U. S. 581 (2004)
Thomas, J., dissenting
lyze whether the term "age" is more naturally read narrowly in the context of § 623(a)(1). Instead, the Court jumps immediately to, and rests its entire "common usage" analysis, ante, at 591, on, the "social history" of the "whole phrase 'discriminate . . . because of such individual's age.' " Ante, at 596. In other words, the Court concludes that the "common usage" of "age discrimination" refers exclusively to discrimination against the relatively old only because the "social history" of the phrase as a whole mandates such a reading. As I have explained here, the "social history" of the "whole phrase 'discriminate . . . because of such individual's age,' " ibid., found in § 623(a)(1) is no different than the "social history" of the whole phrase "discriminate . . . because of such individual's race." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
* * *
As the ADEA clearly prohibits discrimination because of an individual's age, whether the individual is too old or too young, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. Because the Court resorts to interpretive sleight of hand to avoid addressing the plain language of the ADEA, I respectfully dissent.
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