General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 33 (2004)

Page:   Index   Previous  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33

Cite as: 540 U. S. 581 (2004)

Thomas, J., dissenting

lyze whether the term "age" is more naturally read narrowly in the context of 623(a)(1). Instead, the Court jumps immediately to, and rests its entire "common usage" analysis, ante, at 591, on, the "social history" of the "whole phrase 'discriminate . . . because of such individual's age.' " Ante, at 596. In other words, the Court concludes that the "common usage" of "age discrimination" refers exclusively to discrimination against the relatively old only because the "social history" of the phrase as a whole mandates such a reading. As I have explained here, the "social history" of the "whole phrase 'discriminate . . . because of such individual's age,' " ibid., found in 623(a)(1) is no different than the "social history" of the whole phrase "discriminate . . . because of such individual's race." 42 U. S. C. 2000e-2(a)(1).

* * *

As the ADEA clearly prohibits discrimination because of an individual's age, whether the individual is too old or too young, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. Because the Court resorts to interpretive sleight of hand to avoid addressing the plain language of the ADEA, I respectfully dissent.

613

Page:   Index   Previous  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33

Last modified: October 4, 2007