Appeal 2007-0635
Application 10/176,598
Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238 (CCPA 1971).
2. Claims are given their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re
Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
3. “The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of the specification’ without
unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims.” E-Pass
Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369, 67 USPQ2d 1947, 1950 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
Obviousness
4. Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Court
set out a framework for applying the statutory language of §103, language itself
based on the logic of the earlier decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248
(1851), and its progeny. See 383 U.S., at 15-17. The analysis is objective:
Under §103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.
Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject
matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented.” Id., at 17-18.
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