Appeal No. 94-2612 Application 07/759,478 the claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832, 15 USPQ2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The examiner has characterized the rejection under § 103 but, as noted by our reviewing court:6 However, this Court has sanctioned the practice of nominally basing rejections on § 103 when, in fact, the actual ground of rejection is that the claims are anticipated by the prior art. See In re Dailey, 479 F.2d 1398, 178 USPQ 293 (CCPA 1973). The justification for this sanction is that lack of novelty in the claimed subject matter, e.g., as evidenced by a complete disclosure of the invention in the prior art, is the “ultimate or epitome of obviousness.” In re Kalm, 54 CCPA 1466, 1470, 378 F.2d 959, 962, 154 USPQ 10, 12 (1967)[footnote omitted]. Appellants argue that sufficient evidence has been submitted to rebut any prima facie case of obviousness (brief, pages 5-9). However, as discussed above, the subject matter on appeal is described by Röechling within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). A proper rejection under § 102 cannot be overcome by a showing of new and unexpected results. See In 6 In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA 1974). See also In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215 USPQ 569, 571 (CCPA 1982). 8Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007