Interference No. 103,146 See Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1422, 10 USPQ2d 1682, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Rather, this element of inequitable conduct must generally be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicants' overall conduct. See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190, 25 USPQ2d 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Merck, 873 F.2d at 1422, 10 USPQ2d at 1686. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has recognized that the more material the omission, the less the degree of intent that must be shown to reach a conclusion of inequitable conduct. See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 USPQ2d 1666, 1668 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1511 (1998) and cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1510 (1998); Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1481-82, 1 USPQ2d 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). No single factor or combination of factors can be said always to require an inference of intent to mislead; yet a patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it 32Page: Previous 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007