Interference No. 103,224 The primary examiner determined that Hashimoto claims 1-8 correspond to the count. This determination gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that claims 1-8 are directed to the same patentable invention as the count. Cf. 37 CFR § 1.601(j); Case v. CPC International Inc., 730 F.2d 745, 749, 221 USPQ 196, 199-200 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cer . denied, 105 S. Ct. 223, 224 USPQ 736. As the proponent of separate patentability, Hashimoto bears the burden of establishing the nonobviousness of the two-step process with respect to the one-step process. See 37 CFR § 1.601(n) and Behr v. Talbott, 27 USPQ2d 1401, 1405 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992). Accordingly, the fundamental issue for our determination is whether the presentation provided by Hashimoto in motion 1 established a prima facie case of separate patentability sufficient to shift the burden to Skutnik of coming forward with rebuttal evidence. Based on a thorough review of the entire record before us, it is our opinion that motion 1 was woefully inadequate in this regard for the following reasons. As pointed out by the APJ in his Decision on Motions (page 6), it was incumbent upon Hashimoto as the moving party "to demonstrate by the presentation of objective evidence or sound technical reasoning why it would not have been obvious to 5Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007