Ex parte CHARLTON et al. - Page 2


                     Appeal No. 95-4253                                                                                                                                                
                     Application 07/890,394                                                                                                                                            

                                We have carefully considered the record before us, and based thereon, find that we cannot                                                              
                     sustain the examiner’s rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Orrmins or Sublett                                                             
                     et al. or Touey et al. or Tamblyn et al. (answer, pages 3-5).                       3                                                                             
                                It is well settled that the application of the prior art to the claimed invention requires the                                                         
                     determination of the claimed invention encompassed by the appealed claims and that in making this                                                                 
                     determination, the broadest reasonable interpretation must be given to the terms of the appealed claims                                                           
                     consistent with appellants’ specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art.  In                                                    
                     re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893                                                                        
                     F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In doing so, the terms in the appealed                                                                  
                     claims must be given their ordinary meaning unless another meaning is intended by appellants.  See,                                                               
                     e.g., Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055-56, 44 USPQ2d at 1029; York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor                                                                        
                     Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572-73, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996), and cases                                                                       
                     cited therein (a claim term will be given its ordinary meaning unless appellant discloses a novel use of                                                          
                     that term); Zletz, supra.                                                                                                                                         
                                The examiner has premised the rejection on his contention that “‘tow’ is synonymous with                                                               
                     appellants [sic] claimed ‘thread’” (answer, page 3) but has not submitted any reason why one of                                                                   
                     ordinary skill in the art would find that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “thread” based                                                       
                     on appellants’ specification would include a “tow” as this term is used in Sublett et al. or Touey et al.                                                         
                     (note particularly the definition of “tow” at col. 1, lines 57-60) or Tamblyn et al.   Indeed, as pointed          4                                              
                     out by appellants in their reply brief (Paper No. 27), the term “thread” as used in their specification                                                           
                     (page 4, second full paragraph) would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art to have its                                                             
                     ordinary meaning which, as shown by their dictionary citation, is not inclusive of a “tow.”                                                                       
                                It is further well settled that the examiner must satisfy his burden of establishing a prima facie                                                     
                     case of obviousness under § 103 by showing some objective teaching or suggestion in the                                                                           

                     3The references relied on by the examiner are listed at page 2 of the answer. We refer to these                                                                   
                     references in our opinion by the name associated therewith by the examiner.                                                                                       
                     4As relied on by the examiner, Orrmins discloses a “loose, airy wadding H of loose, airy fibrous                                                                  
                     material” (col. 4, lines 8-9) which is not a “tow.”                                                                                                               
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