Ex parte KLOCEK - Page 2


                     Appeal No. 96-0175                                                                                                                                                
                     Application 07/977,388                                                                                                                                            

                     enablement (answer, pages 3 and 6-7).  It is well settled that under § 112, first paragraph, the                                                                  
                     examiner has the burden of providing a reasonable explanation, supported by the record as a whole,                                                                
                     why the assertions as to the scope of objective enablement set forth in the specification are in doubt,                                                           
                     including reasons why the description of the invention in the specification would not have enabled one of                                                         
                     ordinary skill in this art to practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation, in order to                                                           
                     establish a prima facie case under the enablement requirement of the first paragraph of § 112.  In re                                                             
                     Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d                                                                         
                     731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232, 212                                                                      
                     USPQ 561, 563 (CCPA 1982); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA                                                                             
                     1976)(“[T]he PTO has the burden of giving reasons, supported by the record as a whole, why the                                                                    
                     specification is not enabling. In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676, 185 USPQ 152 (CCPA 1975). Showing                                                                  
                     that the disclosure entails undue experimentation is part of the PTO’s initial burden under Armbruster .                                                          
                     . . .”); In re Geerdes, 491 F.2d 1260, 1264, 180 USPQ 789, 793 (CCPA 1974); In re Marzocchi,                                                                      
                     439 F.2d 220, 223-24, 169 USPQ 367, 369-70 (CCPA 1971).  Thus, in order to make out a prima                                                                       
                     facie case under this section of the statute, more is required than the allegation that the “specification                                                        
                     refers to an abrupt change of 1 mm only in the case of gallium arsenide not the broadly claimed                                                                   
                     semiconductors” (answer, page 2).  Accordingly, since the examiner has failed to provide any                                                                      
                     explanation based on the record as a whole why the objective enablement set forth in the specification                                                            
                     is in doubt and would not have enabled one of ordinary skill in this art to practice the claimed invention                                                        
                     without undue experimentation, he has failed to establish a prima facie case under the enablement                                                                 
                     requirement of the first paragraph of § 112.                                                                                                                      
                                We will also not sustain the ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (answer, pages  4 and                                                           
                     7-8) or the grounds of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (answer, pages 5-6 and 8-9), all of which are                                                              
                     based on Chang et al.   The claims on appeal, as represented by claim 1, are drawn to a composition3                                                                                                                                  
                     comprising at least a doped bulk semiconductor material which has at least the specified structural                                                               


                     3The references relied on by the examiner are listed at page 2 of the answer. A discussion of                                                                     
                     Willardson et al. is not necessary to our decision.                                                                                                               
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