Appeal No. 98-2123
Application No. 08/326,669
Before specifically considering the rejections based on
anticipation (i.e., Rejections (1) and (2)), we initially note
that the terminology in a pending application's claims is to
be given its broadest reasonable interpretation (In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1056, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and
In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)) and limitations from a pending application's
specification will not be read into the claims (Sjolund v.
Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d 2020, 2027 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)). Moreover, anticipation by a prior art reference
does not require either the inventive concept of the claimed
subject matter or the recognition of inherent properties that
may be possessed by the prior art reference. See Verdegaal
Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 633, 2 USPQ2d
1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A prior art reference
anticipates the subject matter of a claim when that reference
discloses every feature of the claimed invention, either
explicitly or inherently (Hazani v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 126
F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997));
however, the law of anticipation does not require that the
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