Interference No. 103,586 Brown argue (Brief, page 30) that by the middle of August, 1989, the inventors had a clear and definite approach of isolating and testing the subject matter of the count. Such argument is not supported by the evidence of record. Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 193 USPQ2d 17 (CCPA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977) (Attorney argument will not take the place of evidence in the record). Reiss’s testimony only indicates that by mid August that they had a strategy to obtain a FT enzyme and an assay to determine FT activity. There is no testimony relating to the performance of an assay that included a test substance and the identification of whether the substance serves as an inhibitor of FT activity. Thus, Brown has not established that they were in possession of a complete conception. Conception must include every limitation in the count, and every limitation must have been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception. Nor do we find the alleged work of Reiss on September 20, 1989 to establish a complete conception of the count. As noted earlier, the count requires the presence of a test/candidate substance in the assay. Here, Brown fails to explain how the enzyme preparation and the testing of the enzyme for FT activity establishes a complete conception of the subject matter of the count. Similarly, Casey’s testimony regarding the August 11, 1989 meeting is not sufficient in that it does not establish that the inventors had possession of the subject matter of the count. There is no testimony that the inventor disclosed the subject matter of the count to Casey. At best, Casey establishes use of ras or ras-peptides as substrates -21-Page: Previous 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007